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1INTRODUCTION
in states where a const itut ion is ^regarded as the law of
greater obligation, sooner or later, the question must arise, —
who shall he its final interpreter and deoide upon the compatibil-
ity of laws emanating from the legislative body under this consti-
tution. It was therefore to be expected that the American people,
accustomed to their charters and constitutions from the beginning,
would raise this question at a comparatively early time. The at-
titude of publics opinion as the question presented itself in the
life of the American people down to 1800 is investigated in the fol-
lowing pages. The investigation will probably show that public
opinion has solved the question only up to a certain point, that
the question has been settled in a sort of temporary, superficial
way. Public opinion, for the time being, it seems, has more or
less only accepted a solution of the problem which until now has
worked satisfactorily, but which may prove in the future to be far
from final. Whether laws coming up from Congress may be rejected
as unconstitutional, irrespective of their number, seems never to
have been really touched upon. The federal judiciary has pronounced
laws unconstitutional in but a few scattered cases, and in this,
public opinion has acquiesced.
—0O0
—

2COLONIAL PRACTICE
Among the generation of Americans that converted the colonies
into thirteen " independent sovereign states," the idea of a su-
preme authority exercising the function of setting aside actsof
legislative bodies which it deemed inconsistent with a higher law
was a familiar one. By guaranteeing to the colonists the right
of appeal to the Privy Council, England, as it hoped, controlled
z
the administration of justice in America. Various means were used
to disallow any enactments in conflict with the colonial charters.
By forfeiture of the charter, by act of parliament, by the direct
annulling of legislation through the agency of the Crown, but most
important of all for our purposes, by judicial proceedings and an
ultimate appeal to the Privy Council, England wae able to secure
s
the enforcement of the charters. The supreme judicial authority
was then outside the country.
As the restraints of the charters upon the colonial legisla-
tures were enforced by the English court of last resort , so it be-
came the practice to secure their enforcement through the colonial
courts by declaring void whatever legislation was at variance with
them. Thus in colonial days, when questions arose whether the
statutes made by the assemblies were beyond their powers, the prac-
Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 151
* Greene, Provincial America, 55
I Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, I. 150
""Ibid. . 150

tice of the courts, if the statutes were found to he in excess,
was to declare them invalid, "that is to say, in the first in-
stance, by the colonial courts, or. if the matter was carried to
England, by the Privy Council."
Among the well-known cases in which this usage was followed
z
is that of Lechmere vs. Winthrop, in which the petitioner was John
winthrop of New London. Connecticut, grandson and name-sake of the
first governor of that province. The present John Winthrop laid
claim to all the real estate of his father as the heir under the
common law of England. His only sister, Ann Winthrop, married
Thomas Lechmere of Boston, and in 1724 her husband claimed in
right of his wife, a proportionate share of this real estate. The
3
dispute became a matter of prolonged litigation.
Winthrop took his cause to England. "An Act for the settle-
ment of Intestate Estates" had been in operation in the colony
since October, 1699. The charter granted by Charles II in the
fourteenth year of his reign empowered the governor and assist-
ants in Assembly "to Make, Ordain and Establish all manner of
wholesome 5<r reasonable- Laws , Statutes. Ordinances, Directions,
and Instructions, not Contrary to the Laws of this Realm of En-
gland." winthrop contended that the colonial law which allowed
daughters to receive real estate in the distribution of the prop-
erty of an intestate person was in violation of the law of England.
Toward the close of his long brief in the appeal to the Privy
'Bryce » American Commonwealth, ed. 3, I 249
*Talcott Papers, Conn. Hist. Soc. Coll.. IV, 94; Hazeltine,
Appeals from Colonial Courts. House Docs., XVII, 317
3 Talcott Papers, ibid.. 94. 95
"ibid. , 95
^Poore , Charters. 1,235
6 Talcott Parers. ibid.. 95

4Council, Winthrop says, "We, therefore, insist this law is null
and void, as being contrary to the law of this realm, unreason-
able, and against the tenour of their Charter, and consequently
the Province had no power to make such a law and the same is void."
The decree of his majesty in council sustained ^inthrop and an-
nulled the law. Great anxiety was shown in Connecticut and the
other colonies, for an established custom regarding interstate laws
^as upset in Connecticut and the intestate laws of the other col-
onies were threatened.
The principle of disallowing laws because of their repugnance
to a charter played a leading role in an event of great import-
ance for American history. General searoh-warrants or Writs of
Assistance were issued by Governor Shirley of Massachusetts, but
largely on his own. authority. When the Superior Court was asked
to issue new writs in 1761, James Otis, who was in the employ of
the crown, resigned his office and appeared against the king.
interest and expectation were raised to a high point on ev-
3
ery hand to hear the argument of Otis. "Reason and the constitu-
tion, w he argued, "are both against this writ; though it should
be made in the very words of the petition, it would be void. An
act against the constitution is void." The last ground taken by
Otis in commenting on the Acts of Trade, for the enforcement of
'Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., Ser. 6, V, 4888. In this same ap-
peal to the Privy council appears the following: "Note. The
laws of Connecticut are not by their Charter directed to be laid
before ye Crown for their approbacon or disallowance, so that
there is no other way to void any laws they shall make but by
seeing if they are agreeable to ye rowers of their Charter,
which if they are not, then we apprehend they can not be consid-
ered as any laws at all, since a formal repeal of them can not
be had otherwise than by voiding the Charter."
*Hazeltine, op. cit.. House hoes.. XVII, 319
3 Tudor. life of Otis, 62 *Adams , Works. II, 525

5which the writs were issued, was their incompatibility with the
/
charter of the colony.
Tudor, op. cit., 83. Talcott Papers, Ibid., 96. 97, con-
tain a brief account of Phillips vs. savage (1754), and Clark vs.
Tousey (1745); in these cases, the laws involved were finally sus-
tained after a long period of anxiety.

6THE STATES, 1775-1789
Professor Austin Scott, in a paper before the American His-
torical Association, has said that a study of the principle under
which the state judiciaries ignored legislative acts Just prior to
the adoption of the Constitution "gives a better Knowledge of its
rights within the national sphere, and further will show that, in
the separate colonies and states, under the influence of the loc-
al spirit, quite apart from the idea of union, there grew up in a
denial of legislative omnipotence the means of peaceful coercion
of the States, a true instrument of nationality." fitti this sug-
gestive statement in mind, let us examine the cases involving the
question during this period.
Holmes vs. Walton
Holmes vs. Walton is a case often referred to as the first
z
instance of a resort to the principle that a state .judiciary may
refuse to abide by a legislative act as being unconstitutional and
hence void, it antedates all other cases.
Both houses of the Hew Jersey legislature, in October 1783.
placed on the statute books without a dissenting vote a law author-
izing trial by a jury of six men in proceedings instituted to se-
/
Amer. Hist. Asso. Papers, %l% 45
zAmer. Hist. Rev., iv, 455. coxe, Judicial Power and Un-
constitutional Legislation, 222, gives 1786 as the date of
this case
.
In bobbins vs. Hardaway, Mason argued as early as 1772
against the validity of an act which provided for the sale of
Indian women as slaves, but no decision was reached. See Pol.
Sc. Guar.
,
V, 235
*Amer. Hist. Rev.. Ibid., 463

7cure the forefiture of goods brought in from the British lines.
The issue was fought out before Chief Justice Brearly and his col-
leagues of the Supreme Court in that state. That part of the New
jersey constitution of 1776 which guaranteed the right of trial
i
by jury was held by tbe full bench of the court to render the law
of 1778 unconstitutional. The question ^as first raised November
11. 177Q; tbe fudges gave their opinions on September 7. 1780.
Petitions soon began to pour in upon the assembly . The fron-
tier counties of Monmouth, Middlesex and Essex were especially
prompt to protest against the proceedings of the Supreme Court.
One petition was read in the Assembly on November 21, 1780 urging
that the decisions in cases arising under the "seizure laws,'* "be-
fore a justice of the peace agreeably to the verdict of a jury may
be final, and that such causes may not be removable to the Supreme
Court by certiorari." The sort of response with which public opin-
ion greeted Chief Justice Brearly' s decision was also strkingly in-
dicated on the afternoon of December 8, 178C when, in the House
of Assembly. "a petition from sixty inhabitants of the county of
Monmouth was presented and read, complaining that the justices of
the Supreme Court have set aside some of the laws as unconstitu-
tional, and made void the proceedings of the magistrates, though
strictly agreeable to the said laws, to the encouragement of the
disaffected and great loss to the loyal citizens of the state."
The legislature then sitting did nothing to criticise the court.
'poore, Charters, IX, 1313
*Araer. Hist. Asso. Papers, ii, 46
3 Amer. Hist. Rev., IV, 460
¥ Ibid., 459

8An election was held in October, however, and the legisla-
ture which the people chose passed a law on December 22, 1780, by
the terms of which a tiury of twelve men must be granted on the de-
mand of either party in such suits, and ordered the act to be
printed in the GAZETTE newspaper. Thus the decision was not only
an expression of judicial opinion, but was one in which the leg-
islature acquiesced.
A message from Governor Livingston to the Assembly on the 7th
of June, 1782, makes the executive branch of the government an im-
portant contributor to the public opinion of that day on this ques-
tion. He states that the chancellor or governor must seal a writ
of replevin on the application of any citizen, but "if an act of
legislation can constitutionally be made, declaring that no per-
son in whose possession any goods, wares or merchandise shall be
seized and captured as effects illegally imported from the enemy,
shall be entitled to such a writ ... if such an act, I say, shall
be passed it would probably encourage such seizures and give addi-
tional check to that most pernicious % detestable trade, the total
suppression of which is one of the most important objects that can
z
engage the attention of the legislature."
That the decision of Chief Justice Brearly did set aside a
state law is placed beyond question if we but consider the argu-
ment of counsel for Holmes during a new trial in July, 1781. He
maintained that since the Holmes vs. Walton case was commenced
and remained undertermined at the time of the law authorizing a
trial by twelve men, it did not come within the scope of this law.
'Amer. Hist. Rev., IV, 463
*Ibid. , 460
'Dec. 22. 1780; mentioned above.

9And, it was argued, as a trial "by six men would "be unconstitution-
al, no existing law covered the case.'
Trevett vs. Weeden
The case of Trevett vs. Weeden is one of the most famous in
the history of the country and is generally regarded by historians
and writers on constitutional subjects as the first case of import-
ance in which a legislative act was pronounced void because incon-
sistent with a state constitution. This case came on for a hear-
ing at Newport, Rhode island. 1786.
The exportation of gold had taken place on a prodigious
scale at this time and the cry for paper money was heard through-
out the land, in Rhode island there was an economic cleavage in-
to two well-defined sections, the one agricultural and the other
mercantile. The interests of these two divisions found political
expression and the state became distracted by the "hard" and "pap-
er money" parties. The rural element was in the majority and in
1786, the paper money men consequently won a decisive victory.
The members of the General Assembly became possessed of the
demon of law making and there then ensued the enactment of a ser-
ies of unusual laws. At the June session, refusal to accept
paper money in exchange for goods was made an offense and the pen-
alty annexed was forfeiture of one hundred pounds and a disquali-
fication to hold any office within the state. But in the August
following, the legislative frenzy showed its most radical procliv-
Amer. Hist. Rev., IV, 460
^Bryce , American Commonwealth, I, 249; Cooley, Constitution-
al Limitations, 161; McVaster, History of the People of the U. S.
I, 7,37. 339
J Charming, The United States of America, 119
"ibid. , IIP
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ities. On the principle that "process upon the breach of penal
laws should be immediate." a law was passed providing that if
any person refused to accept paper bills as he would coin, should
"appear before a special court within three days, and there stand
trial, without a jury, according to the laws of the land,"
in its headlong speed, however, the legislature abruptly col-
lided with the judiciary. In September, 178G, John TCeeden, a
butcher of Newport, flatly refused to receive paper money tendered
him by John Trevett in payment for meat which he bought. Com-
plaint was made to Chief Justice Paul l.'ulford of the Superior
Court and thus the issue was tv^own into the courts.
The attitude of the legislature is one striking phase of pub-
lic opinion on the governmental side. This is shown by the lan-
guage used in summoning the nudges to appear before it and give
account of their action. A resolution was passed by both houses
to the effect that
,
"Whereas, it appears that the honorable the judges of the Su-
preme Court of Judicature, at the last September term of the said
court , adjudged an act of the supreme legislature of this state
to be unconstitutional and so absolutely void; and whereas it is
'chandler, Criminal Trials. 277. in Rhode Island, the char-
ter from Charles n remained in force until 1842; and it guar-
anteed the right of trial by jury in all cas^s. See Thayer,
Cases, I. 150 and Poore, Charters, II . 15P5
^Chandler, Ib_d. , 327: "The legislature has assumed a fact
in their summons to the judges which was not justified or vfar-
ranted by the record. The plea of the defendant in a matter
of mere surplusage mentions the act of the General Assembly as
unconstitutional and so void; but the judgment of the court sim-
ply is that the information is not cognizable before them. Hence
it appears that the plea has been mistaken for the judgment."
—
Judge Howell, in a speech before the legislature in defense of
the judges.
Chandler, Ibid., 33?: "It is perfectly immaterial upon
the present argument , whether the judgment of the court was
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suggested that the said judgment is unprecedented in this state
and nay tend to abolish the legislative authority thereof; it
is therefore voted and resolved that all the justices of said
court be forthwith cited by the sheriffs of the respective coun-
ties in which they live or may be found, to give their immediate
attendance upon this assembly, to assign the reason and grounds
for the aforesaid judgment; and that the cleric of said court be
directed to attend this assembly at the same time, with the re-
cords of the court which relate to the said Judgment."
The decision of the court did not meet with general approval
among the voters of Rhode Island as is shown by the vote of the
town of Coventry, instructing their representatives to use their
influence in the general assembly, that the judges of the super-
ior court be dealt with according to the nature of their offense.
The judges "exceeded the bounds of their jurisdiction by giving
their determination that the law nade by the general assembly of
this state was unconstitutional, when it was the duty of said
court to have given their Judgment . whether the said John Weeden
z
was guilty of a breach of the law of this state or not."
The judges appeared at the bar of the legislature and spoke
in defense of their action. Judge Howell, the youngest member of
the court, in a learned six-hour speech, declared that "for the
right or wrong; ... the only question is whether they can. in
any respect, be brought to answer for it, but by due process
of law."— James M. varnura in a speech before the legislature
in defense of the judges.
The judges decided that, "^hereupon, all and singular the
premises being seen and by the justices of the court aforesaid
fully considered; it is considered, adjudged and declared, that
the said complaint does not come under the cognizance of the
justices here present and that the same be and is hereby dis-
missed." Pol. Sc. Quar. , V, 234
'Pol. Sc. Quar., v, 234 x chandier, Ibid.. 341
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reason of their judgments upon any question judicially before
them, they were accountable only to God and their consciences."
Judge Tillinghast testified he was confident that his conduct "met
l
the approbation of his God," and Judge Hazard remarked, "if there
could have been any prepossession in my mind, it must have been
in favor of the act of the general assembly; but it was not pos-
sible to resist the force of conviction." The assembly decided
that the reasons given by the judges were not satisfactory, and
4.
a motion was made to dismiss them from office.
Before the motion came to a vote, however, a memorial by
Judges Hazard, Tillinghast and Howell was sent in to the legis-
lature. In this the judges asked for a hearing before a tribun-
al regularly constituted, and for an opportunity to answer to
specific charges, if any could be brought against them. In this
same petition, they "utterly protest against the exercise of any
power in the legislature, by a summary vote, to deprive them of
s
their aforesaid office, without the aforesaid due process of law."
After the memorial had been presented, Mr. James varnum, one
of the ablest lawyers of the day and a member of the Continental
Congress in 1780, addressed the House in defense of the court. He
argued that the judicial arm of the government not only had the
right but was duty bound to disregard unconstitutional legislation,
Thayer, op. cit., I, 76
z
chandler, op. cit., 333
? Ibid. , 333
ibid., 334
fIbid. , 334
Henry Marchant was also retained for the defendants. In
1777, he was a delegate to the Continental Congress; and when
the government was organized under the constitution, Mr. Mar-
chant was appointed by Washington a judge of the district court
of Rhode Island
I!
13
The legislature, he said, "have the incontrollable power of
making laws not repugnant to the constitution; the judiciary have
the sole power of judging of those laws, and are bound to execute
then; hut can not admit any act of the legislature as law, which
i
is against the constitution." As for the law passed "by the Rhode
Island assembly, it was "unconstitutional and void." and "this
court has power to judge and determine what acts of the general
assembly are agreeably to the constitution."
According to the argument of Mr* Varnum, not only may the
court do this of right but it is "under the most solemn obliga-
tions to execute the laws of the land, and therefore can not. will
z
not. consider this act as a lav/ of the land." At the conclusion
of the speech, a motion was passed calling upon the attorney gen-
eral for his opinion whether the legislature had the constitution-
al right to remove the judges of the supreme court without due
process of law,
William channing, the attorney general, cast some light on
the professional opinion of the time by his open declaration that
he believed their judgment agreeable to law. But "be their judg-
S
ment agreeably to law or not," he said, ... there would be a fatal
interrruption ... of government, if they could be suspended, or
removed from office, for a mere matter of opinion, without a
charge of criminality."
'chandler, op. cit.. 314
xIbid. , 325
fibid. , 341
"ibid . , 343
*Ibid. , 343. Benjamin Bourne, the first representative to
Congress after the constitution was adopted, and afterwards a
circuit judge of the U. 3. Court, defended the positions taken
by the attorney general. See Chandler, op. cit., 349

The House passed a resolution by a large majority that the
judges had given no satisfactory reasons for their judgment, but
since no charge of criminality had been preferred against them,
they were allowed to leatfe the assembly without further attendance
At the ensuing session, their terms of office having expired
other judges were appointed/ The law which had given rise to this
controversy was soon afterwards repealed.
Commonwealth vs. caton
Edmund Randolph, another delegate to the Federal Convention,
was a prominent figure in judicial proceedings involving the prin-
ciple of declaring laws unconstitutional. The legislature of Vir-
ginia passed a law in 1776 which tooK from the executive the power
of pardon and conferred it on the House of Delegates. The lower
chamber of the legislature exercised its newly acquire! function
to free a certain Caton. who had been convicted of treason. When
Attorney General Randolph moved for execution upon the prisoner,
the latter pleaded the pardon of the House. Under the constitu-
tion as it then was, the case was referred to t v:e court of appeals
because of the new and difficult points involved.
The arguments in the case could hardly have been otherwise
than lively, and must have b-^en given with much feeling, as they
drew from Justice Wythe, the ultimatum: "If the whole legislature,
an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds
'chandler, op. cit.. 349
*Ibid. , 549
3 Baldwin, American Judiciary, 110
^Elliot's nebates, V, 322: "In Rhode island, the judges who
refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced; and
others substituted, by the legislature, who would be the will-
ing instruments of the wieked 8e arbitrary plans of their mas-
ters." — Madison
George Wgthe and John Blair, whose names appear on the rol
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prescribed to them by the people. I. in administering the public
justice of the country, will meet the united powers at my seat in
this tribunal: and. pointing to the constitution, will say to them,
here is the limit of your authority, and hither shall you go, but
no further." The issue thus raised was not decided.
President Pendleton felt the reach of this principle, and
realized that it was fundamental one. He ieclar°d that the ques-
tion how far "this court . . . shall have power to declare the nul-
lity of a law passed in its forms by the legislative power, ...
if? indeed a deep, important, and i will add, tremendous question,
the decision of which involves consequences to which gentlemen may
not have extended their ideas." He was happy in the hope that the
legislature would remove "the disagreeable necessity of ever de-
ciding it .
"
The report of the case also says: "Chancellor Blair and the
rest of the judges, were of the opinion, that the court had power
to declare anv resolution or act of the legislature or or either
s-
branch of it, to be unconstitutional and void."
The attornev-general argued in the Court of Appeals that
whether the act was contrary to the spirit of the constitution or
6
not, "the cou^t was not authorized to declare it void."
of the Federal Convention, sat as nudges in this case.
'4 call ( va. ) , 8
*willoughby. The Supreme Court, 30. A remonstrance was sent
to the Virginia legislature
.
9 4 Call (
v
a . ) . 17
*Ibid. , 17
fxbia . . 20
*Ibid. , 7. j. b. Cutting, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson,
speaks of the "manly proceeding of a Virginia court of appeals.
Without Knowing the particular merits of the cause. I may ven-
ture to applaud the integrity of judges who thus fulfil their
oaths and their duties. I am proud of suoh characters. They
exalt themselves and their country, while they maintain the

16
Rutgers vs. Haddington
The celebrated case of Rutgers vs. Haddington was an occa-
sion for the expression of well-defined views indicating the atti-
tude of the legislature, party organizations and the citizens of
New York . The issue in this litigation was decided by the Mayor's
Court of New York City in June 1784, janes Duane presiding.
In its decision, the municipal court refused to take into ac-
count what it considered to be the unconstitutional portions of
the Trespass Act. By the provision* of this law. " rhigs, at the
termination of ttw ^ar, were allowed to recover rent fro: M the Tor-
ies for any houses they nay have occupied while the British were
in possession of the city.
The popular branch of the legislature passed a resolution
condemning the action of the court. "The judgment . it was declarei
"is, in its tendency, subversive of all law and good orier and
leads iirectly to anarchy and confusion." The legislature also
believed that acquiesence in the decision would involve dangerous
consequences, for "if a court instituted for the benefit and gov-
ernment of a corporation may take upon themselves to dispense with
a law of the state, all other courts may do the like; and there-
with will end all our iear \ ought rights and privj leges, and leg-
z.
islatures become useless . "
The decision created a great deal of excitement ani aroused
the resentment of the "violent Whigs," the party of which Clinton
principles of the constitution of Virginia and manifest the un-
spotted probity of its judiciary department." Bancroft. History
of the Constitution, II, App . . 473
'Memoirs of Aaron Burr. II, 44
*!MdL , 47

was the leader. The popular feeling became so great that a mass
meeting of the Whigs was held on the 13th of September, 1784. As
a result of the meeting, a committee was appointed which prepared
and published an address to the people of the state.
In the opinion of the committee, the 7 roceeding of the court
was "an assumption of power in that court, which is inconsistent
z
with the liberties of the people." It was declared that to invest
the courts with the power of controlling the legislature would be
absurd. The function of the courts of justice "from the very na-
ture of their institution, is to declare laws, not to alter them."
The legislature recommended that such persons be appointed
mayor and recorder of the City of New York "as will govern them-
9
selves by the known laws of the land."
The case was probably not of as great importance as the de-
monstrations of public disapproval at the time would seem to indi-
cate, for Alexander Hamilton in referring to it says that "the
suit of Rutgers va« Waddington. after a partial success in the
Mayor's Court, was terminated by a compromise ... owing to the ap-
prehension of an unfavorable issue in the supreme court: and this,
notwithstanding the defendant was a British subject."
Bayard vs. singleton
Whether the courts of north Carolina should enforce a law
which they deemed unconstitutional was a question carefully con-
f
sidered in 1787. The court was thrown into doubt and considered
the task of deciding between the legislative and judicial powers.
;
Davis. Memoirs of Aaron Burr, II, 45
*Ibid. , 45
9 Davis . Ibid. , 47
^Hamilton's Works (Hamilton), V. 115. 116; Vii, 199
*Pol
.
so. Quar . , v . 238 ^===^===

1After long and oarnful deliberation the court decided that the con-
t
stitution niUBt regain in force "as ttia fundamental law of the land.
ani that the legislative act *nrot ... stand as abrogated and irith-
z
out any effect
.
* It seemed clear that no act passed by the leg-
islature "oould by any means repeal or alter the constitution .
They felt that if this were possible, the government established
by the constitution would be dissolved.
The stand of the court, however, was not universally accept-
ed at that time, justice Spaight stated the point of view of those
in opposition very forcible when he said: "I do not pretend to vin-
dicate the law which has been the subject of controversy; it is
immaterial what law they have declared void; it is their usurpa-
tion of the authority to do it, that I complain of, as I do most
positively deny that they have any such power; nor can they find
anything in the constitution either directly or impliedly, that
will support them or give them any color or right to exercise that
authority. Besides it would have been absurd, and contrary to the
practice of all the world, had the constitution vested such power
in them, as the? would have operated as an absolute negative on
the proceedings of the legislature, which no judiciary ought ever
to possess, and the state, instead of being governed by the repre-
sentatives in the general assembly would be subject to the will
of three individuals, who unitel in their own persons the legis-
lative and judiciary powers, which no monarch in Europe er.ioys. and
which would be more despotic t r an the Roman decemvirate. and equal-
'pol. 3c. Quar. . V. 238
^Haines . op. cit., 31
*l*cPee. Life and Correspon lence of James Iredell. II. 169
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ly insufferable." in thlB letter, which is dated August 12th, 1787.
it is stated that the Assembly , in more instances than one, passed
laws militating against the constitution, and of a more dangerous
nature "than the one which the fudges, by their own authority/,
thought proper to set aside and declare void."
The great argument, as set forth by Mr. Iredell in an address
was "that though the Assembly have not a right to violate the con-
stitution, yet if they in fact do so. the only remedy is. either
by a humble petition that the law may be repealed, or a universal
resistance of the jjeople." But, as was answered at the time, to
petition in this manner would he asXing the legislators to be grac-
iously pleased not to be their tyrants.
James Iredell, who was one of the counsel in the case and a
member of the Philadelphia convention, was in favor of the exer-
cise of this power. In a letter to James Spaight on August <;6th.
1787, he argues that since the constitution is a fundamental law.
either it must be obeyed, "by the rejection of an act unwarranted
by and inconsistent with it, or you must obey an act founded on an
authority not given by the people, and to which, therefore, the
people owe no obedience." Most of the lawyers, he believed, were
of his opinion.
Although Justice Iredell was confident that "if any act of
Congress or of the legislature of a state violates those constitu-
tional provisions, it is unquestionably void," yet he admitted that,
"as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful
nature, the court will never resort to that authority but in a
7
McRee
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clear and urgent case." A oourt oannot pronounce a law void mere-
ly because it is contrary to the principles of justice.
Justice Iredell was pursuaded that this power had all the
force of duty. nWe felt." he says, "in all its rigor the mischiefs
of an absolute and unbounded authority, claimed by so weak a creat-
ure as man, and should have been guilty of the basest breach of
trust, as well as the grossest folly, if in the same moment when
we spurned the insolent depotism of Great Britain, we had estab-
lished a despotic power ourselves.
According to one authority, the Federal Convention was in-
fluenced by news which it received of the decision in this case
when it adopted its resolution of July 17.
Case of the Judges
Cix years after Commonwealth vs. caton, Virginia was again
agitated over the question of determining the constitutionality
of a law when the famous "Case of the Judges" came to a hearing
in the state courts. An act of the assembly was passed establish-
ing district courts in January, 1788. The constitutionality of a
previous law "had been occasionally discussed by statesmen and
others," but after the passage of the district court law, "the
question was more frequently agitated, and different views taken
by those who opposed, and by those who favored, the act." The
court sent a remonstrance to the governor with a request that he
lay it before the general assembly.
; Pol. Sc. Quar. . v, 244
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in its communication to the governor, the judges expressed
their regret at being obliged "to pass upon the constitutionality
of a law." They declared that the alternative was either to de-
cide the question or resign their offices, and that the question
fftl not considered until this dilemma was presented. The latter
would have been their choice but "finding themselves called by
their country to sustain an important position as one of the pil-
lars on which the great fabric of the government was erected, they
judged that a resignation would subject them to the reproach of
deserting their station and betraying the sacred interests of so-
ciety entrusted with them."
In the report of the case, the decision of the judges is
shown to be "that the constitution and the acts are in opposition,
that they can not exist together; and that the former must control
z
the operation of the latter." The court also maintains that if
this opinion, declaring the supremacy of the constitution, needs
any precedents to support it, they "may be found in the opinion
of th« legislature themselves, who have, in several instances,
considered the constitution as prescribing limits to their powers,
as well as to those of the other departments of government."
Opinion in Massachusetts
Public opinion on the judicial power of annul ing a law seems
to have crystallized early in Massachusetts. An exchange of let-
ters between Mr. Justice Gushing and John Adams gives an interest-
ing sidelight on the subject/
In his letter of reply, Mr. Adams says, "You have my hearty
' 4 Call ( va . ) . 142
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concurrence in telling the jury the nullity of acts of parliament,
... I am determined to die of that opinion let the ius gladii say
what it will."
It has been inferred that this was the prevailing opinion
when in 1779 Massachusetts formed her constitution. The fundamen-
tal law was particularly emphatic in the wording by which it es-
tablished the separate and independent character of the three de-
z
partments of government. If this preconceived notion concerning
the functions of the courts existed, the duty of enforcing the pro-
visions of the constitution in cases between individuals would of
necessity have devolved upon the judiciary. This se^ms to have
been the intent of the man who drafted the constitution .
*
The separation of the three departments of government in
such precise terras occurs in the Bill of nights which, it would
seem, was an attempt to place the dogma on higher grourds even
than the constitution. But Massachusetts without doubt also con-
ferred this power on the courts by statute. A law was passed in
1786 repealing all legislation at variance with the treaty of Great
Britain. The Massachusetts act provided that "the courts of law
and equity within this commonwealth be, and they are hereby, di-
rected and required in all cases and questions coming before them
respectively and arising from or touching the said treaty, to de-
cide and adjudge according to the tenor, true intent and meaning
of the same, anything in the said acts or parts of acts to the
contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding."
;
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It wa« about this tine that the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts , when the legislature ignored a fundamental law of
the state, "solemnly determined that the particular statute was
unconstitutional.'1 The legislature, however, displayed no feel-
s' 3 *
ing. At its next session, the law was unanimously repealed.
It is probable that Flbridge Gerry had this instance in mind
when in the general convention at Philadelphia, he said that "the
judges had actually set aside laws as being against the const itu-
s
tion. This was done too with general approbation."
Report of John Jay
One of the most important documents penned during the confed-
* eration period was a report to the Continental Congress by John
t
Jay, secretary for the department of foreign affairs. It seems
not to have been cited by writers on the subject of the powerful
weapon which the Supreme Court now wie:is, but a reading of the
document compels one to conclude that the great secretary was ar-
i guing for the investiture of the state courts with power to disal-
low state laws.
The report as prepared by Jay, after exhibiting the griev-
ances that had been recited by Great Britain in papers to John
I
Adams, the American ambassador, states that certain questions pre-
|
sorted themselves, one of these was whether by acts of its own
! internal legislature, any individual state has a right "to explain
and decide the sense and meaning in which any particular article
'cutting to Jefferson. Bancroft, op. cit., II, Apr.. 473
z Ibid. , 473
? Baldwin, American Judiciary, 110
'Bancroft, Ibid., 473
^Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, I, 97
6 Secret Journals of Congress, IV, 185

of a national treaty shall be received and understood within the
limits of that state?" In case doubts arise about the meaning of
state laws, state legislatures may remove those doubts by "explan-
atory and declaratory acts," but when doubts arise regarding the
meaning of a treaty, even "Congress itself have no authority to
2
settle and determine them." only the parties to the treaty have
the right by mutual consent to place a construction on a treaty.
But in cases between private individuals the procedure is of
course different. All doubts then are "in the first instance mere
judicial questions; and are to be heard and decided in the courts
of justice having cognizance of the causes in which they arise."
The "rules and maxims established by the laws of nations for the
interpretation of treaties" govern the courts in their determina-
tions under this head.
Since the states are without power, what is to be done? The
report contains three resolutions for Congress to enact into law.
The first resolution is in substance that the legislatures of the
several states shall not pass an 1 ' act to explain a national treaty.
By the terms of the second resolution, any acts existing, repug-
nant to the treaty of peace, shall be repealed. But the third re-
solution which Congress is called upon to pass is the most inter-
esting of all. The states are to make the above-mentioned repeal
"rather by describing than reciting the said acts." To do this.
an act is to be passed, declaring "in general terms" that the acts
repugnant to the treaty are repealed, and that the "courts of law
'secret Journals, op. cit., 203
Ibid. , 204
15 lb id. , 2 OP4 Tbid. . 233

and equity in all causes and questions cognizable by them respect-
ively, and arising from or touching the said treaty, shall decide
and adjudge according to the true intent and meaning of the same,
anything in the said acts or parts of acts to the contrary there-
of in anywise notwithstanding." The effect of a repeal in gener-
al terms would be to turn the whole business over "to its proper
department," the judicial; and the "courts of law will find no
difficulty in deciding whether any particular act or clause is or
is not repugnant to the treaty."
On March 31, 1787, Congress unanimously agreed to the reso-
lutions in the form recommended by the secretary of foreign af-
3
fairs
.
Sec. Jour., op. cit . , 283
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THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE SOURCES BEARING
on them
in reaping a new structure on the ruins of the Confedera-
tion, iioense and anarohy were ahandoned in favor of liberty and
unity. The members of the general convention at Philadelphia
and students of government in general saw that in doing this,
the power to pronounce upon the constitutionality of laws must
exist somewhere within the new system. Only on this principle
could any sort of stability In our foreign relations he secured.
And within this political system, moreover, a vigorous national
government and harmonious relations in the region of the states
and among the people were the sine qua non/ An efficacious plan
then, "for the peaceable decision of ail controversies arising
within itself." was indispensable.
The new government might be either confederate or national.
But to expeot voluntary acquiescence among so many independent
states "was a calculation forbidden by a knowledge of human na-
ture, and especially so by the experience of the confederation."
As Alexander Hamilton pointed out in The Federalist , such an ar-
rangement would be a hydra in government • The central author-
ity must be the deciding factor.
The force of this came home even to the "small state" men;
it remained only to choose the .ode.'' This could be either pre-
Address of Gouverneur Morris to Pa. legislature. Sparks.
Life of Gouverneur Morris, in, 438
*Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, I, 238; Ibid.
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ventive or corrective, so far as the abrogation of state laws
was involved. As for a preventive remedy, a negative or veto
on state laws could be provided. The other principle might be
embodied in the form of a legislative repeal, judicial interven-
t
tion, or by an "administrative arrest of them." It was in the
deliberations over these and other minor possibilities that one
of the most striking features of our constitution was wrought
out
.
The States as Arbiters
That the states should be the umpire in stopping the opera-
tion of unconstitutional laws is a notion some traces of which
may be found in the debates of the convention and the writings
of the delegates. It is a novel fact that one of the four lead-
ing plans debated by members of the convention proposed to con-
fide this power in the state executives. Hamilton's proposal.
Which was submitted on June 18th, contained a preventive meas-
ure which contemplated the appointment of the executive officer
of each state by the central government. By this arrangement,
state laws of an unconstitutional nature would be dealt with,
in carrying out the plan, each state executive was to exercise a
negative on the laws of his state. Mr. Langdon aptly observed
that from this point of view the question was whether the gener-
al or the state governments were to judge the score of the con-
f
stitution and Mr. PincKney, who moved and later withdrew a mo-
tion for this scheme, declared that state executives should be
Tyler, Ibid., 527; Farrand . II, 75; Ibid., III. CCCXCI, 523;
Maciison to Tyler, Ibii.. 527
^Madison to Trist , Ibid., 516; Madison to Tyler, Ibid., 527
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399
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given this power and "that it would be so provided if another
convention should take place."
As a repository of the power to intercept unconstitution-
al legislation, whether local or national, the legislative de-
partment occasioned but slight discussion. To grant the power
to state Judiciaries, moreover, except as courts of the first in-
stance, seens also to have been considered inadmissible. "Con-
fidence," said Madison, "can not be put in the State Tribunals
as guardians of the National authority and interests;" in all of
the states, the courts were more or less dependent on the leg-
islatures. In Georgia, they were appointed annually by the leg-
islature and in Phode Island, "the judges who refused to execute
an. unconstitutional law were displaced," continued Madison; "and
others substituted by the Legislature, who would be the willing
4instruments of the wicked £ arbitrary plans of their masters."
Coercion
Hamilton had remained a silent member of the convention un-
til his notable speech of June IB when he made known what he re-
garded as the principles on which the government must of necess-
ity be founded. Force was named as one of these, "by which may
f
be understood a coertion of laws or coertion of arms." Which one
should it be'
All three of the plans before the convention involved some
form of coercion by arms. Some of the delegates, however, did
not regard the proposals in that light. Mr. Wilson, while con-
'ibid., II, 391 *Ibid., 1 , 120
5Ibid., II, 27 "ibid., II, 28
'ibid.. Ill, CLXIII, 241; Ibid.. I, 284

trasting the Virginia and New jersey plans implies in his re-
marks that the former lid not rest on the coercive principle. On
another occasion, Luther Martin of Maryland is sponsor for the
statement that the "federal plan of Mr. paterson does not re-
z
quire coercion more than the national one," and on still another
day MP. Bedford truly says, "after all, if a State does not obey
the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the
3
only ultimate remedy, in this as in any other system." Since
government, of necessity and from its very nature, contains this
ingredient, the real aim was to reduce its proportions in the
v
scheme, and if possible make it unnecessary. This the new con-
s
stitution meant to do.
Force, while it might serve as an ultimate resort, could
not be the usual method of enforcing the laws in the affairs of
every day life, except in a government based on fiction. The
use of force "against the unconstitutional proceedings of the
States would prove as visionary I fallacious as the Govt, of
6
Congs." A union on such a basis "seemed to provide for its own
destruction." Even if not flimsy, it would be unjust. To "at-
tempt the execution of the laws of the Union by sending an armed
force against a delinquent state would involve the good and bad,
f
the innocent and guilty in the same calamity." War would ensue,
and not punishment. No less demoralizing was its effect on those
using it. As viewed through the eyes of Mr. Randolph, "it tend-
'parrand, i. 252 *lbid., 341
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ed also, to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood
and riot in the spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequent-
ly trained them up for the service of Ambition. n Thus, we see,
the principle was wrong in theory and impossible in practice.
Legislative Negative
Fiction again raised its head in the Federal Convention when
it was assumed there could be a law contravening the Constitu-
tion, which was itself law. This is the theory which underlay
the legislative negative, the direct opposite of which vital-
izes the existing political system.
The legislative negative was "extensively favored, at the
x
outset." George Mason , in a letter to his son, as early as May
20, wrote that "the most prevalent ilea in the principal States
seems to be a total alteration of the present federal system and
substituting a great national council or parliament and to make
the several State legislatures subordinate to the nation, by giv-
ing the latter the power of a negative upon all such laws as
3
they shall judge contrary to the interests of the federal Union."
Writing again on Junel, Mason said the idea was "still the prev-
4
alent one."
The career of this scheme in the convention, from the stand-
point of its essential nature, exhibits several curious phases,
very early in its sittings, on May 31. without debate and without
a dissenting vote, provision was made to declare void "all State
laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat Leg the articles of
Varrand, I, 255
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/
the Union." This was the plan in its mildest form.
It remained for Pinckney to run the whole gamut of legisla-
tive powers, on June 8, he moved to amend the original form,
giving to the legislature the right "to negative all laws passed
by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the nation-
z
al legislature ," etc . Thus the scope of the plan "/as enlarged to
inolude all laws, whether unconstitutional or not, and in this
shape it found a warm advocate in Madifion, for he "could not but
regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the
States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system." The conven-
¥
tion, however, did not acquiesce in it.
The summer wore on and finally, as late as August 23, the
convention was again considering the plan. This renewal of it
involved one change, the requirement of two-thirds rather than a
majority of each branch of the legislature. When John Quincy
Adams was preparing the debates of the convention for publication,
in 1818, he received from Mr. Pinckney a copy of the constitution
he had proposed in the convention, in the accompanying letter,
Pinckney says, "soon after the Convention met I changed ?*. avowed
candidly the change of my opinion on giving the power to Con-
gress to revise the State Laws in certain cases .. .thinking it
6
safer to refuse (it) altogether." In a letter penned by Mr. Mad-
ison on June 27, 1831, he classes this statement as "among the
instances in which the nemory of Mr, Pinckney failed him." The
name of the mover is not on record in the journal, "but satis-
'Farrani, I, 54 Itoid., 162
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factory information exists that it was lip, Pinckney." Thus we
have another stage in the progress of the legislative negative
during the convention.
The "accomodating proposition to the small states" was made
by Edmund Randolph on July 10 and in this we may observe the re-
lation which discussions of the legislative negative had to the
z
present constitutional plan. The fourth resolution provided that
any state might appeal to the national judiciary against a nega-
tive, which, if found unconstitutional, would he void. A citi-
zen, moreover, in accordance with the fifth resolution, "conceiv-
ing himself injured or oppressed by the partiality or injustice
of a law of any particular state, may resort to the National Ju-
diciary, who may judge such law to be void." This would seem to
be evidence of an advance in the direction of judicial non-con-
currence in unconstitutional legislation.
The legislative negative was doubless suggested by an ac-
quaintance with the English constitution. Madison, himself, is
authority for the statement that it came from "the negative in
the head of the British Empire, which prevents collisions between
i
the i arts ft the whole, and between the parts themselves." The
legislative negative was maie "a special charge against J ad ison
by "Mutius" who took Madison to task for several things done by
the convention, using Yates' notes as the basis for his criticism.
Madison, discussing the charges in October 1333, asked if it was
to be wondered at "that among the early thoughts on a subject so
complicated and full of difficulty, one should be turned to a pro-
'Madison to Sparks, Earrand, III. App. A. CCCLXXXIV, 503
z Ibid., LXI, 57
s Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787,
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vision in the compound and on this point analogous system of which
this Country had made a part." The king wielded irresponsible
pow^r which "had rendered the provision justly odius," hut un-
der the American system, it would he carried out by an elective
authority. Madison believed that its usefulness had been clearly
demonstrated in England, for "nothing could maintain the harmony
a T d subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the pre-
rogative by which the crown stifles in the birth every Act of ev-
ery part tending to discord or encroachment."
Could the idea be reduced to practice? Some Kind of machin-
ery was necessary to render it useful and we may note four inter-
esting suggestions under this head. Objection had been made on
the ground that all of the laws would have to be sent up to the
general legislature; but in a speech on July 17, Madison showed
that this could be avoided Mby some emanation of the power into
the states, so far at least as to give a temporary effect to laws
3
of immediate necessity." Aside from an introduction of the states
into the adninistration of the scheme, the central government was
considered as the proper source of motive power for this exped-
ient. One ^ay of ending the contradictions between general and
local laws was a proposal "de nommer un committee des deux cham-
bers, charge de' examiner toutes les loix des Etats individuels et
de reieter toutes celles qui seront contraires aux maxim.es et aux
vues du Congres." it was also proposed to asnign this function
'Madison to Rives, Farrand, op. cit . . ill. App. A, CCCXCI.
523
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to one branch only of the legislature; it was thought the nega-
tive in this form would, have even more friends than it had other-
wise, for the upptx house was to rest directly on the states. Then,
too. the lower house might be too numerous to sit constantly. The
;udiciary, moreover, was also considered as a means of carrying
the legislative negative into execution. The accomodating v.ropos-
itiDn to the small states, as we have seen, contained the proviso
that "am/ state r.ay appeal to the national Judiciary against a neg-
2
ative," which, if adjudged unconstitutional, "shall be void." As
we see, the machinery for carrying out the measure was to be eith-
er the states, the federal senate, congress or the national jud-
iciary .
The principal objections to the proposed legislative nega-
tive in the sphere of its practical working were found in the ex-
tent of the country, the number of the states, and the multiplic-
s
ity of their laws. It was seen that as time went on these objec-
tions would have greater weight.
"Are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most ur-
gent cases." demanded Mr. Bedford in the convention, "until they
can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the delib-
erations of a body who may be capable of Judging of them?" He won-
dered if the legislature would be in session continuously for the
purpose of judging the laws as they came up from the states.
In committee of the whole, J'r. Mason inquired, "Is no road
'Madison to Tyler, Farrand, op. cit.. Ill, CCOXCII, P27;
Madison to Rives. Ibid., CCCXCI, 523; Ibid.. I, 168
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nor bridge to be established without the Sanction of the General
Legislature? Is this to sit constantly in order to receive & re-
vise the State Laws?" It was not his intention, however, to con-
demn the idea.
Aside from these objections, the competency of congress was
also questioned in this connection. "Will a gentleman from
Georgia, asked Itfr, Iansing, "be a Judge on the expediency of a
law which is to operate in R . Hampshire. Such a Negative would
be more injurious than that of Great Britain heretofore was."
Opposition to the principle on more general grounds also dev-
eloped. Mr. Butler was "vehement agst . the negative," "as cutting
off all hope of equal justice to %1he distant States." It was
meant, Mr. Bedford found, "to strip the small States of their e-
qual right of suffrage." This statement was made on June 8, and
v
'r. Martin, who spoke upwards of three hours on June 87g declared
that "the states, particularly the smaller, would never allow a
f
negative to be exercised over their laws." From the standpoint
of the states, the proposal appears to have been regarded an an
instrument in the hands of the large state men, at least until
6
equality in the senate was established.
Gouveneur Morris opposed the power as unnecessary, "if suf-
ficient Legislative authority should be given to the Genl. gov-
ernment." Mr. Sherman, moreover, was of similiar opinion, "the
*
laws of the General Government being Supreme % paramount to the
7
State lawa according to tre plan, as it now stands." To Mr. Gerry.
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the legislative negative was "a leap in the dark," and he Relieved
the powers to which it extended ought to he defined/
On the great underlying principle involved, however. Mr. Sher
nan nade what was perhaps the most significant comment of all, when
on August 23. in committee of the whole, he affirmed that "such a
power involves a wrong principle, to wit, that a law o~ a State
contrary to the articles of the Union, would if not negatived, be
z.
valid 7< operative."
Enthusiasm was somewhat weakened by the belief that the pol-
itical system about to be raised would provide for judicial dis-
allowance of unconstitutional laws. f.r. Sherran thought it unnec-
essary, "as the Courts of the States would not consider as valid
any law contravening the Authority of the Union, and which the
legislature would wish to be negatived." Gouverneur Morris also
became more and more opposed to the negative because "a law that
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary depart-
ment," and with another method in mini, he added, "if that secur-
ity should fail, may be repealed by a national law."
Support of the legislative negative was both negative and
positive. It constituted a protection against certain dangers
and was likely to impart desirable qualities to the legislation.
Dangers were ap- rehended fro vi the variant constructions that would
be made by different interests, and even if partiality were not
shown, dangers would arise from "ambiguity in ... judgment." James
Monroe, moreover, pointed out the great positive virtue when he
'Fa-rar.d, op. cit., I. 412 *E11. Deb.. V, 322
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sail, "it will, if the body is well organized, be the best way of
introducing uniformity in their proceedings that can be devis'd."
Farly in the convention, as we have seen, it became the set-
tled purpose of the delegates to employ the legislative negative
in the government about to be organized. Leaders in the debates
looked upon it as indispersible and its necessity was frequently
z
dwelt upon. Writing in 1333, Madison declares, "the necessity of
3
it appears to have been taken for granted." Subordination of the
states was essential and this method was referred to as the only
one by which the states could be prevented from "disturbing ye
order * harmony of ye whole, % ye governnt. render' d properly nat-
ional , Se one." The necessity of "some adequate mode of prevent-
ing the states in their individual characters , from defeating the
constitutional authority of the states in their united character,
and from collisions among themselves, had been decided by a past
f
experience." Madison, on July 17, said "the necessity of the gen-
eral Govt, proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue
their particular interests, in opposition to the general interest,
in short, "to recur to the illustration borrowed from the plane-
tary system, this prerogative of the General Govt, is the great
pervading principle that must control the centrifugal tendency of
the states; which, without, will continually fly out of their
proper orbits and destroy the order and harmony of the political
7
system." Mr. Wilson considered this "the key-stone wanted to
S/onroe to Jefferson, Farrand, op. cit., App. A, Iil,
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compleat the wide arch of Government we are raising. ,f/
Negation by the legislature, an already noted, was opposed
because other expedients, especially the national judiciary,
seemei more worthy of adoption. For the contrary reason, it was
favored. Padison considered it "the mildest expedient that could
he devised for preventing these mischiefs," for if no such pre-
caution be adopted, "the only remedy would lie in an appeal to
i
coercion." Not only coercion, but legislative repeal, was op-
posed from this standpoint. The states could "pass laws," de-
clared Padison on July 17, "which will accomplish their Injur-
ious objects before they can be repealed by the Genl. Legistre.,"
3
and then added, "or set aside by the National Tribunals." Thus
we also find the negative preferred above the judiciary. Corres-
pondence written in 1787 and remarKs made by Wilson in the conven-
disclose the feeling that it would be more convenient "to prevent
the passage of a law than to declare it void after it is passed
... that a State w"< ich would violate the Legislative rights of
the Union, would not be very ready to obey a judicial decree in
support of them." To prevent the passage of a law rather than de-
clare it void afterwards, was held to be the wiser course, parti-
cularly "where the law aggrieves individuals, who may be unable
to support an appeal agst . a State to the supreme Judiciary."
Col. Taylor also embraced the legislative negative because he "re-
garded the control of the Fedl . Judiciary over the State laws as
6
more objectionable than a legislative negative on them." Wadi-
;
Farrand. op. sit., II, 391 Ibid. , I, 164
? Ibid. , II , 27
^Madison to Jefferson, Ibid.. Ill, App . A , CXXXV, 399; Ibid...
II, 391
Madison to Jefferson, Ibid., 399
^'adir-on to Rives, Ibid., Ill, App. A, CCCXCI, 524

son's rejoinder to the statement that the courts might disregard
an unconstitutional law was that "nothing has yet been offered
to invalidate the doctrine that the meaning of the Constitution
may as well he ascertained by the legislature as by the judicial
authority." All of these quotations go to show that the national
judiciary was frequently in the minds of the delegates while the
legislative negative was under discussion.
The Virginia and Pinckney plans, be it noted, embodied the
principle of a legislative negative on state laws, and early in
its proceedings, the convention adopted it in committee of the
whole. In common with coercion of arms, however, it was given
up. Such a power, as Sherman indicated, involved a wrong princi-
ple.
Council of Revision
A belief was current at the time of the convention that the
liberty of the people was in great danger from legislative usurp-
ation and although the proposition had once failed before, Madi-
son, wiison, Ellsworth and Mason all spoke in favor of a council
of revision as a means of guarding against this tendency. But
even then it was thought the legislature would not have a foeman
worthy of its steel. Experience under the articles of Confeder-
ation was solemnly pointed to as having "evinced a powerful ten-
dency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex." The
lesson was plain; ev^ry expedient, in keeping with the republi-
can form of government should be lodged iritis the other depart-
ments as an offset to the legislature.
111. Deb., iv, Madison in House of Representatives( 1789 )
.
399
•^Madison, Writings, (Lodge's ed ) . 25; Mason to Mason, Far-
rand, op. cit.. Ill, App. A. XV. 23; Ibid., II, 73; Ibid., 75
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Defense of the executive, however, was not the only reason
for a council of revision. Through their function as expositors,
said Col. Mason, the judges "could impede in one case only, the
operation of laws. They could declare an unconstitutional law
void." As for any other law, "however unjust oppressive or per-
nicious," if it was not at the same time unconstitutional, the
z
judges would have no alternative hut to accept it. "Laws may he
unjust," said Mr. Wilson, "may he unwise, may he dangerous, may
he destructive, and yet may not he so unconstitutional as to jus-
3
tify the Judges in refusing to give them effect." The judiciary
should be allowed to aid in forestalling laws of this kind.
Advocates of the council of revision associated many advan-
tages with the scheme. As already indicated, Mr. Wilson urged
that it was not sufficient that the judges "as expositors of the
Laws would have an cpportunity of defending their constitutional
rights." To he ahle to defend its constitutional rights, however,
was one advantage to the judiciary. And Malison, on July 21, in
enumerating the advantages of an executive council, said it would
give to the judiciary, "an additional opportunity," with which to
combat legislative encroachments. It would, moreover, be advan-
tageous to the executive by "inspiring additional confidence \
firmness;" it would redound to the service of the legislature "by
the valuable assistance it would give in preserving a consistency,
conciseness, perspicuity, * technical propriety in the laws;" and
it would be a blessing to the people at large, "as an additional
check agst . a pursuit of those unwise & un.iust measures which
;
Farrand, or, . cit . , 1 1 , 74
*Ibid. , 78; Ibid.. 73 JIbi:i.. 73
"ibid . , 73 'ibid. . 74
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I
constituted so great a portion of our aalamities. " Mr. Ells-
worth also concurred in these sentiments and added that where
the law of nations might he involved, the judges would he the on-
x
ly ones having adequate knowledge.
A large part of the opposition to the council of revision
was based on the assumption that the judiciary would have a neg-
ative on state and congressional laws. Mr. Gerry thought the
judiciary would have H sufficient ch^ck agst encroachments on
their own department by their exposition of the laws, which in-
volved a power of deciding on their constitutionality, in some
States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being against
3
the constitution. This was done too with, general approbation."
Mr. King was no less explicit in an observation made by him on
June 4. "The judicial," he said, "ought not to join in the nega-
tive of a law, because the Judges will have the expounding of
those laws when they come before them; and they will no doubt
stop the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the Con-
stitution." Two days later, Mr. Madison conceived there was
weight in the objection "that the Judges ought not to be subject
to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might
give in the exposition of them." The motion was open to strong
objections, for "it was making the expositors of the Laws, the
Legislators which ought never to be done." Mr. Gorham believed
"the judges ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no pre-
possessions with regard, to them", for, as ! r. Strong observed.
'Farrand, op. cit., II, v 74; Ibid., p 73; ibid., I, pp
138 ,139 *Ibid . . II , 74
'ibid., I, pp 97. PS *Ibid., p 109; Ibid., 98
rIbid., 138. 139 'ibid., II, 75
«*** 1M »j.n .
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the power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of ex-
pounding the laws. No maxim "as better established." As Mr,
pinckney put it, the exercise of this function would give "tinc-
i
ture to their opinions." Mr. Rutledge argued that the executive
should get advice from the members of his cabinet; "the fudges
ought nev^r to give their opinion on a law till it corner before
them." Thesr> opinions go to show that a mixture of the judicial
and executive functions was regarded as improper by a number of
the delegates
.
Direct affirmation that the national judiciary would have a
right to pronounce la^s unconstitutional was made in discussions
bearing on the executive council. Luther Martin did not believe
judges were any better versed in the sphere of legislation than
would be the legislature. And "as to the Constitutionality of
la^s," he said on July 21, "that point will come before the judges
in their proper official character, in this character they have
a negative on the laws." As a result the judiciary would have
a two-fold negative, and in oT posing laws favored by the people,
as they might have to do occasionally, confide] 1, ce in them would
be weakened.
improper mixture of executive and judicial functions was not
accepted as a weighty objection by either Wilson or Madison. Mr.
Wilson contended that "the prepossession to mix itself with the
exposition," was an evil associated with advantages that would
outweigh any untoward consequents flowing fror. its adoption.
f
Few cases, thought Madison, would come before a judge during his
lifetime vrhich he bad already considered while a member of the
'pairand
,
op. cit., n, 75 *ibld. , 298
9 Ibid., 80 ''Ibid.. 76, 77 flbid . , 80
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executive council.
National Judiciary
Many important reasons existed why the government should be
built anew and among these Sherman included the necessity of mak-
ing more effectual provision for the security of private rights,
and "the steady Unpens ftt ion of justice." Failure to obtain this
under the Confederation produced the convention.
Several modes were open to the convention in accomplishing
this end. All were finally abandoned, however, and "the only re-
maining safeguard to the Constitution an^ laws of the Union, agst
.
the encroachment of its members and anarchy among themselves, is
that which was adopted, in the Declaration that the Constitution
laws % Treaties of the U . S. should be the supreme law of the
land, and as such be obligatory on the Authorities of the States
as well as those of the u. 3." The final appeal must be to the
central government, and "it was this vi^w of it which dictated
the clause declaring that the Constitution and la^s of the United
States should be the supreme law of the land, anything in the con-
2
stitution or laws of any States to the contrary notwithstanding."
Credit for the adoption of this means belongs to Luther Martin
as Oliver Ellsworth conceded in a document which he wrote criti-
3
cising Martin
.
The difference between the new and the old systems was "in
point of political operation." As between "a league or treaty,
and a Constitution, the former in point, of moral obligation might
be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation.
'parrand, op. cit.. III. Arn. A. CCCLXXXVIII . 516; Ibid.,
CCCXCII. 587
* v adison on Nullification. Ibid., CCCXCVIII. 537. 538
Ellsworth. The Landholder. Ibid., CLXXXIX . 272, 273

there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1.
A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might be
respected by the Judges as a law. though an unwise or perfid-
ious one. A law violating a constitution established by the peo-
pie themselves, would be considered as null % void."
The constitution thus established was to he "the supreme
law of the land," and the jurisdiction of the national judic-
iary vras extended to oases "arising under the constitution." By
"force of logic" at least, whether with deliberate intention or
not. the constitution makers gave to the national judiciary pow-
er to disregard national statutes. The constitution "defines the
extent of the powers of the general government. If the general
government should at any time overleap their limits, the judic-
ial department is a constitutional check, it the United States
go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitu-
tion does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the
national judges, wro to secure their impartiality, are to be made
z
independent, will declare it void."
. Most important of all was to establish the principle, as
Governor Randolph observed during the debates in the convention,
and with this once established it would be the business of a sub-
committee to the committee of the whole to work out the details.
And so it was unanimously agreed on June 13 to strike out such
parts of the resolution as would leave the principle established.
In carrying out the principle thus established, the rela-
yFarrand . op. cit.. II, 93
Ibid., Ill, App. A, CLXIII. 241
Ellsworth in Corn. Conv . , ibid. . CLX, 240. 241
'parrard, Yates Notes. I, 238

tive place of the national and state judiciaries in the scheme,
it It was thought, would he of great importance, Who was to de-
cide in the first instance 9 Mr. Rut ledge declared on June 5 that
"the State Tribunals might and ought to be left, in all cases, to
decide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the supreme
national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights
and uniformity of judgments." But the clause placed in the con-
stitution was something very different from this to Luther Mar-
tin. Replying to The Landholder, March 1788, he states that "as
inferior continental, and not state courts, are originally to de-
cide on those questions, it is now worse than useless, for being
so altered as to renier the treaties and laws made under the fed-
eral government superior to our constitution, if the system is
adopted it will amount to a total and unconditional surrender to
i
that government."
Many members of the Federal Convention were unable to escape
the conviction that the national judiciary should be endowed with
power to disregard laws. This, too. in spite of the fact that
<
"it may be a misfortune that, in organizing any government, the
explication of its authority should be left to any of its coor-
dinate branches. There is no example in any country where it is
otherwise. There is a new policy in submitting it to the judic-
iary of the U. S." In an address to the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture, Morris, referring to a New Jersey law, "which the .judges
pronounced unconstitutional, and therefore void," said that "no
good citizen can wish to s^e this point decided in the tribunals.
i
Such power in judges is dangerous; but unless it somewhere exists,
the time employed in framing a bill of rights and form of govern-
'Farrnrl . np. nit . itt. hyatt. p. br z pii. Dev., iii-iv.f-54.155
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ment was merely thrown away." The necessity of the new judicial
po'*er weighed heavily on Mr. Dickinson, who could not agree that
the judiciary "should he bound to say that direct violation of the
constitution ^as law. ... Encroachments of the popular branch of
the government ought to be guarded against. The Ephori at Sparta
became in the end absolute." Although there was a strong moral
oertainity amor.g the delegates that the national judiciary should
have power to declare laws uncorst itutional , it was not formally
embodied in the constitution.
Several members of the Federal Convention, both in and out
of session, declared themselves unequivocally opposed to the prin-
ciple. Mercer Unapproved of the doctrine that the judges should,
"as expositors of the constitution, nave authority to declare a
law void. Laws ought ti be well and cautiously ^ade. and then to
be uncontrollable." Mr. Dickinson was strongly impressed with the
remark of Mr. Mercer, "as to the power of the judges to set aside
the law. He thought no such power ought to exist." At the same
time, he was unable to suggest a substitute plan. An interesting
fact in this connection is that ten years after the convention,
Pinckne*' repudiated the idea. "Upon no subject, " he said, "am
I more convinced than that it is an unsafe and dangerous doc-
trine in a republic ever to suppose that a judge ought to possess
the right of questioning or deciding upon the constitutionality
of treaties, laws, or any act of the legislature." In
a letter to John Quincv Adams in 1818, Pinckney records his change
of mind in regard to the legislative negative "very soon after
'sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, ill, 438
*yasriiia, op. cit.. n, 279 *Ibid., II, 299
3 Ibii., 298 'Thayer, Marshall, 66
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the convention met."
Fviience that the judicial method of dealing with unconsti-
tutional legislation was seriously thought of by the constitu-
tional fathers is more abundant in amount and more positive in
character in connection with the discussions on the council of
revision. This evidence has already been considered under that
head
.
One ^ore interesting comment should be noted. It arrears
in a letter by Morris, who believed that the judicial negative
must exist somewhere Within the new system. "Having rejected re-
dundant and equivocal terms, n says i/orris, "l believed it to be
as clear as any language would permit; excepting, nevertheless,
a part of what relates to the judiciary, on that subject, con-
flicting opinions have been maintained with so much profession-
al astuteness, that it became necessary to select phrases, which
expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shocv their
self-love, and to the best of my recollection, this was the only
part which passed without cavil."
Sparks. Life of I'orris, III, p 323
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THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE STATES DISCUSSIONS IN THE CON-
VENTIONS—THE FEDERALIST
After the general convention at Philadelphia had framed the
constitution, it was submitted by Washington to Congress and then
to conventions in the several states for ratification. In the
debates which followed are to be found the opinions of some of
the most prominent leaders on the power of the courts to impede
the operation of unconstitutional legislation. It was forseen
that Congress did not have power to legislate on every subject
and that the limitations to its power ^ould be enforced through
the intervention of the courts.
Marshall, in the Virginia convention, indicated that the com-
petence of Congress was not absolute. They could not, for in-
stance, make laws affecting the mode of transferring property, or
contracts, or claims between citizens of the sane state. Can
they go beyond their delegated powers 9 he asked. In ca^e they
should maKe "a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated,
it vrould be considered by the judges as an infringement of the
Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider
such a law as coming under their Jurisdiction. They would declare
it void." Thus many years I efore Farbury vs. Madison, it appears
that Marshall entertained a settled conviction regarding the ex-
ercise of this power.
Additional weight may be attached to thse words from a con-
sideration of proceedings in the United States senate in January
1800. A motion introduced by Mr. Breckinridge to repeal the act
'Ell. Deb. , III , p 553
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for a new organization of the judiciary system was being debated.
Mr. Jhltledge took Hr. Jeffersor. at his word, and in seeking the
meaning of the constitution on the right of the national .judic-
iary to declare a law unconstitutional, he quoted the words used
by Marshall in the Virginia convention. Gen. Marshall, as he said
was among the "friends of the constitution."'
The importance of the courts as a barrier to laws militat-
ing against the constitution was definitely recognized also by
Patrick Henry in the Virginia convention. Referring to a prev-
ious speaker, he said "the honorable gentleman did our judiciary
honor in Baying that they had firmness to counteract the legisla-
ture in some cases. Yes. sir, our judges opposed the acts of the
legislature. We have this landmark to guide us. ... Are you
sure that your federal judiciary will act thus? Is that judic-
iary as well construct , and as independent of the other branches
,
as our state judiciary. Where are your landmarks in this govern-
ment'' I will be bold to say you can not find any in it . I take
it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of the
legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the
z.judiciary." The sentiment which } r. Henry voiced is all the more
significant when it is remembered that he opposed the constitu-
tion on the ground that the government to be organized under it
would be of a consolidated character.
In the Pennsylvania convention, one of the delegates de-
clared the powers given to the judges were dangerous. But Mr.
Wilson, for his part, believed the contrary inference to be true
and declared that "if a law should be made inconsistent with
those powers vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges,
'f!1. Deb.. Ill, 553 zIbid. . 324, 325

as a consequence of their independence, and the particular pow-
ers of government "being defined, will declare such law to be null
and void; for the power of the constitution predominates, any-
thing, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress contrary
thereto, will not have the force of law." Iff. Wilson had prev-
iously taken the same stand while a
tiudge on the circuit.
Marshall. Kenry and Randolph in Virginia; Wilson in Pennsylv
ania, Ellsworth in Connecticut and Davics in North Carolina all
discussed the principle of judicial nullification in the ratify-
ing conventions. Their sentiments are summed up in the quota-
tions already given.
The Federalist
Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist the grounds on
which rests the present constitutional mode for the practical se-
curity of each department against the invasion of the other. His
trenchant pen proclaimed the dangers from legislative omnipotence
and infringements by the states. The barrier best suited to with
stand these tendencies was the one finally embodied in the Con-
stitution.
The mass of power under the Constitution was allotted to the
central government and after discriminating in theory the sever-
al classes of power which in their nature might be legislative,
executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task was
to provide a guarantee for each against any designs cherished by
the others. The legislative department was "everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its im-
'Kll. Deb., op. cit., II, 489
*The Federalist (Lodge's ed . ) no. XLVII, 308

petuous vortex." Legislative usurpations, moreover, "by assem-
bling all power in the sane bands, must lead to the same tyranny
as is threatened by executive usurpation." In republican govern-
3
ment , "the legislative authority necessarily predominates."
But a government with prominent federal elements in it must
also guard against dangers in the direction of the states. The
states are prohibited from doing a number of things such as the
imposition of taxes on imported articles and the emission of pap-
er money. Such provisions will not be duly regarded "without
some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct
if.
the infractions of them"
Of what nature must the expedient be 9 This power "must eith
er be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in
the federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest con-
S
tratfention of the Articles of Union." There was no third course,
and the latter "appears to have been thought by the convention
preferable to the former," declared Hamilton, "and, I presume.
6
will be most agreeable to the States."
Arid so, in the last analysis, the supreme court was to be
the "bulwark of a limited Constitution against legislative en-
7
croachments , " state and national. Hamilton, moreover, in his
writings, argued that the complete independence of the courts of
justice is essential in a limited Constitution. By this type of
constitution, he understood "one which contains certain speci-
fied exceptions to the legislative authority." It is possible to
'The Federalist, op. cit., no XLVill, 309
xIteid., 309 *Ibii., no. LI, 324
*Ibid., no. LXXX, 494 ^Ibid. , 494
'ibid., 494 *Ibid., no. LXX^III, 487

preserve limitations of thin Kind in practice only through the
medium of courts, "whose duty it must be to declare all acts con-
trary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without
this, all the reservations of j articular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing."
Perplexity has arisen "respecting the rights of the courts
to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the Con-
stitution, n on the supposition that the doctrine would imply a
z
superiority of the judiciary over the legislative department.
"It is urged that, the authority which can declare the acts of an-
other void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts
3
may be declared void." on what ground then does this doctrine
rest*?
Hamilton declares there is no position which depends on
clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority,
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exer-
\
cised, is Avalid. "No le-islative act, therefore, contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid." To deny this, he said, would be to
affirm, "that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the peo-
ple are superior to the people themselves ; that men acting by vir
tue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not author-
ize, but what they forbid."
What rule of discretion is to guide the courts in the per-
formance of this function? The exercise of Judicial discretion
is exemplified in determining between two contradict ory laws. If
'The Federalist, op. cit., no. LXXVIII, 485
*Ibid. , 485 3Ibid. , 4 85
*Ibid. , 485
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the two are irreconcilable and it becomes necessary to give ef-
fect to one in preference to the other, the rule "which has ob-
tained in the courts for determining their relative validity is.
#
that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first."
The question then arises whether, between a constitution and a
law in controvention , the same rule is followed.
v/hen there' is a conflict between the acts of "an original
and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate
the converse of that rule as proper to be followed." They teach
us, according to Hamilton, that "the prior act of a superior ought
to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subor-
dinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular
statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the
judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the
x
former.
"
Hamilton also answered the objection that "the courts, on
the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure
to the constitutional intentions of the legislature." There was
no weight in this. This could as well happen in the case of two
contradictory statutes; or it might occur in any and every judic-
ial proceeding involving a statute. "The courts must declare the
sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the sub-
stitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."*
This observation would prove too much, for it would prove that
only the legislature should judge a law.
'The Federalist, op. cit., 4SF,
*Ibid. , 487
* Ibid. , 487
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Hamilton went further even than to assert the right of the
courts to disregard, an invalid law. Should the law be supported
by a majority of the people, the judiciary must take the same at-
titude. But it is easy to see, said Hamilton, "that it would re-
quire an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their
duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legisla-
tive invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of
the community."
'The Federalist, op. cit., 483
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ORGANIZATION of the federal judiciary
The right of a cooordinate branch to pronounce sentence of
unconstitutionality on the acts of another department of govern-
ment was clearly recognized by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Laws,
not onlv of a state legislature hut of Congress, could be account-
ed of no legal effect by the state judiciaries, subject to an ap-
peal to the supreme court. The law provided "that a final judg-
ment or decree in any suit . in the highest court of law or equity
of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is
drawn in question the validity of a treaty or a statute of. or an
authority exercised under the United States and the decision is
against their validity ... may be re-examined and reversed or af-
firmed in the Su: reme Court of the United States upon a writ of
error. n
Re-organization of the Federal Judiciary
The doctrine of unconstitutionality was vigorously discussed
in the United States Senate in 130 and by Senator Breckinridge of
Kentucky, explicitly denied. If the constitution was to be a
practical one, he did not believe "the power of the courts to annul
the laws of Congress" could "possibly exist." Each of the depart-
ments, he said, "are intended to revolve within the sphere of their
own orbits, are responsible for their own motion only, and are not
to direct or control the course of others; that those
for example, who TiaVe the laws, are presumed to have an equal
Elliot's Debates, IV, 444
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attachment to, and interest in, the Constitution, are equally
hour.-} by oath to support it, and have an equal right to give a
construction to it." The construction, by each, of its own
powers is of as high authority as if done by any other depart-
ment , while the interpreter is actually more competent to judge
of the powers exclusively given to it. The legislature, there-
fore, "would have an equal right to anr.ul the decisions of the
courts, founded on their construction of the Constitution, as
the courts would have to annul the acts of the legislature found-
ed on their construction." Although the courts "may take upon
them to give decisions which go to impeach the constitutional-
ity of a law, and which, for a time, may obstruct its opera-
tion, yet I contend that such law is not the least obligatory
because the
.
organ through which it is to be executed has re-
fused its aid. A pernicious adherence of both departments to
their opinions would soon bring the question to an issue, which
would decide in whom the sovereign power of legislation resided,
and whose construction of the Constitution as to the law-making
power ought to prevail."'
The doctrine, however, was not without its supporters in
the upper house. Senator Rutledge pointed to the Judiciary Act
of 173P as evidence in this connection. "As early as the year
1789," he said, "among the first acts of the government, the
legislature explicitly recognized the right of a state court to
declare a treaty, a statute, and an authority exercised under
the United States, void, subject to the revision of the Supreme
Court of the United States; and it has expressly given the fin-
Elliot 's Debates. I 1 '. 444
7
*lbicl., 447
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al power to the Supreme Court to affirm the judgment which is
against the validity either of a treaty, statute, or an author-
ity of the government
.
It nay he of interest in this connection to refer to a
rather novel aspect of official public opinion regarding the
Judiciary Act. in 1824, Mr. Letcher of Kentucy sponsored a re-
solution in Congress desigr.ed to amend the Judiciary Act so that
only by a majority vote of the judges could a state act he de-
to amend
clared unconstitutional. An effort was made in 1830 that part
of the act "by which the supreme court is empowered to pass up-
on the constitutionality of state lawn." It failed in the House
of Representatives by a vote of 137 to 51.
' Sumner. Andrew JacKson, 173
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FEDERAL PRACTICE—1789-1803
The earliest case involving the relations of Congress and
the Federal Judiciary is known as the "first Hayhurn case". Wil-
liam Haybum applied to Associate Judges Wilson and Blair and Dis-
trict Judge Peters of the United States circuit court for the
district of Pennsylvania to be put on the pension list, in accord-
ance with a law of Congress passed in 1792. The court refused to
x
take cognizance of his case.
The judges addressed a letter to the president in which they
dwelt upon the sentiments which on "a late painful occasion' gov-
erned them with regard to an act passed by Congress. "Upon due
consideration . runs the letter, "we have unanimously of opinion,
that, under this act, the circuit cert, held for the Pennsylv-
ania district, could not proceed; ... Be assured, that, though
it became necessary, it was far from being pleasant. To be ob-
liged to act contrary either to the obvious directions of Con-
gress, or to a constitutional principle, in our judgment, equally
obvious, excited feelings in us, which we hope never to exper-
ience again." 3 This letter was sent to the president shortly af-
ter a similar one had been received from John Jay and his asso-
ciates .
The legal opinion of the time is further indicated in a let-
ter which James Iredell wrote to his wife. He was on the circuit
'American His. Rev., XIII, 283
*2 Dallas( Curtis ) . 10
'ibid. , 10
McRee, Life and correspondence of Ja^.es Iredell, II, 361

with Mr. Wilson in 1792. "We have had a great deal of business
to do here," he writes, "particularly as I have reconciled my-
self to the propriety of doing the Invalid-business out of Court.
Judge ""ilson altogether declines It.* " re have already seen that
Mr. ,rr ilson . who was probably the commanding personality among the
fudges, had clearly stated his position, on the principle involve
as a delegate to the Federal and Pennsylvania state conventions.
what was the attitude of Congress toward the action of the
court*? A memorial was presented to the Houne of Representatives
by William Kayburn setting forth the refusal of the court to pro-
ceed under the law. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, who had been
an attorney in the Holmes vs. Walton case, was then a member of
Congress and from an explanation he gave to the House, the court
appeared to consider the duty imposed on them by the late law.
"a very extraordinary" one. They looked on the law "as an uncon-
stitutional one." "This being the first instance in which a cour
of justice had declared a law of Congress to be unconstitutional,
the novelty of the case produced a variety of opinions with re-
spect to the measures to be taken on the occasion."'
Newspaper comments on the "first Hayburn case" exhibit dif-
ferent shades of opinion. There is both praise and blame for
the proceedings in the court. Several refer to the decision as
unconstitutional
.
z
Freneau's National Gazette gave a summary of the work of
Congress in which this statement appeared: "The decision of the
iudges ftgain8t the constitutionality of an act in which the ex-
7Annals of Congress, Second Congress, 557
*Am. Hist. Rev., XIII, 235

60
ecutive had concurred with the legislative departments, is the
first instance, also, in which that branch of the government has
withstood the proceedings of the other."
The agitation engendered by the decision is well shown by
what appeared in Bache's General Advertiser for April 20. 1792.
"Never was the word 'impeachment* so hackneyed." declares this
paper, "as it has been since the spirited sentence passed by our
judges on an unconstitutional law. The high-fliers, in and out
of Congress, and the humblest of our humble retainers talk of
nothing but impeachment: impeachment I impeachment l as if for-
sooth Congress were wrapped up in the cloak of infallibility,
which has been torn from the shoulders of the Pope; and that it
was damnable heresy and sacrilege to doubt the constitutional
orthodoxy of any decision of the in, once written on calf-skin : " '
Freneau's National Gazette, to quote from this paper again,
adopts a more cautious tone on the subject of impeachment. The
following statement was made April 23: "We agree ... that human-
ity is better pleased With the conduct of the judges of the
Eastern circuit; but ... they too have, in a delicate manner
passed sentence of unconstitutionality on the invalid law. We
... assert that the word » impeachment • was several times men-
tioned in the House of Representatives although no motion was
made on the subject." Another paper regretted that the human-
ity of Congress had been thwarted by the action of the judges.
'Amer. Hist. Rev., XIII, 28 c-
2
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Invalid Pension Act
Under the invalid Pension Aot of March 23, 1792, federal
circuit courts were required to receive, and decide upon the
merits of. applications for pensions by those who had sustained
injuries while in service during the " rar for inder endence . The
decisions of the courts were subject to review hy the Secre-
tary of war.
Chief Justice Jay. Associate Justice Gushing and District
Judge Puane of the Circuit court for the district of Pew York
considered the duty assigned by the act as extra-judicial. While
they did not leal with its constitutionality directly, they did
state that the act can only he considered as "appointing commis-
sioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official instead of
personal descriptions . " The judges, however, acted unier the
law hut not in their official capacity. "As the objects of this
act are exceedingly benevolent . and do real honor to the human-
ity and justice of Congress, and as the judges desire to mani-
fest on all proper occasions, and in every proper manner, their
high respect for the national legislature, they will execute
z
this act in the capacity of commissioners."
The judges in the case did not content themselves with a de-
claration simply of their sentiments in regard to the law and
their charitable motives for acting as commissioners, but ad-
dressed a letter to President Washington containing the same
vie^rs, with the request that he forward them to Congress. A
i
letter of very muoh the same character was sent up from Newburn
,
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North Carolina on June 8 by Associate Justice Iredell and District
Judge Sitgreaves of the circuit court for the district of North
Carolina.
Edmund Randolph, the attorney general, wrote a letter to
President Washington on August 5, 1792, at a tine when the rum-
or was afloat that the latter might not he a candidate for the
presidency. The attorney general prophesied that many trying or-
deals, the result of which on the public mind could not he
foreseen, awaited the judiciary. In this same communication, he
states, "it is much to he regretted, that the judiciary, in spite
of their apparent firmness in annulling the pension law, are
not what sometime hence they will be, a resource against the in-
fractions of the Constitution on the one hand, and a steady as-
serter of federal rights on the other." He also thought that "the
precedent, fixed by the condemnation of the pension law," might
justify every constable in thwarting the laws, "If not reduced to
its precise principles."
vanhorne's Lessee vs. Dor^ance
This is now regarded as the first case in which a federal
statute at variance with the constitution was declared void.
The issue grew out of a territorial controversy between Con-
necticut and Pennsylvania. Settlers from the former claimed land
in Pennsylvania under an Indian deed executed by the Six Nations.
Justice Paterson, who, since the constitutional convention
'sparKs, Life and Writings of Washington, X, 513Z
U. S. Reports, 2 Dallas, 304
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at Philadelphia, had been elevated to a place in the Supreme
Court, discussed the principle at some length on thiB occasion.
Legislatures, he thought, were creatures of the constitution,
from whence comes their authority. Therefore, he said, "all
their acts rust be conformable to it, or else they will be void.
... Whatever nay be the case in other countries, yet in thiB
there can be no doubt that every act of the legislature, repug-
nant to the Constitution is absolutely void." The court, more-
over, must so consider it. "I take it to be a clear ^ositior.,"
said Justice Paterson. "that if a legislative act oppugns a con-
stitutional principle, the former must give way, and be reject-
ed on the score of repugnance, i hold it to be a position equal-
ly clear and sound, that in such case it will be the duty of the
court to adhere to the constitution, and to declare the act null
ani voil."
At one stage in his elaborate charge, the court even showed
feeling in stating its views, omnipotence in legislation was
declared to be despotism. According to this doctrine, "we are
all tenants at will , and hold our landed property at the mere
pleasure of the legislature. Wretched situation, precarious
tenure! And yet we boast of property and its security, of laws,
of courts, of constitutions, and call ourselves free! In short,
gentlemen, the confirming act is void; it never had constitu-
tional existence; it is a dead letter, and of no more virtue or
avail, than if it never had been made."
'u. S. Reports. 2 Dallas* 307
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Calder vs. Bull
"If any act of Congress, or of the legislature of a state."
said Justice Iredell in a concurring opinion in calder vs. Bull.
"violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably
as
void; thought I admit, that the authority to declare it void is
of a delicate and awful nature, the court will never resort to
that authority but in a clear and urgent case." Justice Chase
would not commit himself on the propriety of entrusting the nat-
ional "judiciary the right to declare laws unconstitutional.
A Connecticut law had set aside the decision of a probate
court and provided for a new hearing. Counsel for the plaintiff
in this case condemned this legislative act, which granted a new
hearing in Calder vs. Bull, as an ex post facto law. prohibited
bv the constitution; that such a law. state or national, is void
and that the court had the undoubted right to declare a law con-
trary to the constitution, voil. The court decided there was
nothing in the constitution to prevent a state from passing a
z.
retroactive law touching property right onli'.
Justice Chase lid not believe the legislature was within
its rights but declined to say whether the supreme court could
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. If "a government,
composed of legislative, executive, and judicial departments
were established by a constitution which imposed no limits on
the legislative power, the consevmence would inevitably be, that
whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawful-
ly exacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pro-
'calder vs. Bull, 3 Dallas, 39P
^Ibid. , 386

65
nounoe it void! it iR true, that some speculative jurists have
held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in
itself, be void; but I can not think . that under such a govern-
ment any court of justice would possess a power to declare it so.
In summarizing his views, justice Iredell holds that if a
legislature goes beyond the limits of its authority, "their acts
are invalid." for thev then "violate a fundamental law. which
must be our guide, whenever we are called upon as judges to de-
termine the validity of a legislative act."
Cooper vn. Telfair
"Although it in alleged that all acts of the legislature,"
observed Justice Chase in Cooper vs. Telfair, "in direct opposi-
tion to the prohibitions of the Constitution, would be void; yet,
it still remains a question, where the po ,-Ter resides to declare
it void. It is. indeed, a general opinion, it is expressly ad-
mitted by all this bar. and some of the judges have, individu-
ally, in the circuits, decided, that the Supreme Court can de-
clare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional and therefore,
invalid; but there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court it-
self upon the point. I concur, however, in the general senti-
ment with reference to the "neriod."
of
The issue in this proceeding grew out enactments by the leg-
islature of Oeorgiaas a result of which a certain Cooper and oth-
ers were driven from the state, and their property confiscated.
The circuit court declined to disregard acts of the state leg-
islature, which it had been argued in the trial were contrary to
' 3 Dallas, op. oit.. 398 *
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constitution of the state of Georgia.
Justice gushing also commented on the constitutional as-
pect of the case. "Although I am of opinion." he said, "that
this court has the same power that a court of the State of Georg-
ia woull possess, to declare the law void. I do not think that
the case wouli warrant any exercise of the power. The right
to confiscate and banish, in the case of an offending citizen,
must belong to very government. It is not within the judicial
power, as created and regulated by the constitution of Georgia,
and it naturally, as well as tacitly, belongs to the l^gisla-
ture . "
States Pights
Assertion of the right to declare state legislation uncon-
stitutional brought the national judiciary into conflict with
at least two states during the decade of 179C. and culminated
in the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, in Chisholm vs. Georg-
ia, national sovereignty was vigorously maintained by the court,
upon refusal by the state to accept service in 1793. Justice
Blair, in his opinion, claimed that "when a state by adopting
the Constitution has agreed to be amenable to the Judiciary of
the United States, she has. in that respect, given up her right
of sovereignty." in the conflict with New Hampshire, the state
was extremely defiant and declared that it would not admit "the
laws made before the existence of the present government by this
(then independent state) to the adjudication of any rower on
earth." This case resulted from the capture by one KoClary of
7
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the "Susanna," which was condemned and ordered to he sold by
the admiralty oourt of New Hampshire. The decision was reversed
hy the federal Court of Appeals in cases of capture and this re-
versal was upheld by the supreme court. The attitude of the
courts of the nation was considered by New Hampshire a "viola-
tion of state independence and an unwarrantable encroachment in
the courts of the United States."
I

KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS
The passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts by Congress was
a victory for the Federalists under the leadership of Albert Gal-
latin. In their defeat, the Republicans bethought themselves of
a means to circumvent their victorious opponents. Resolutions
were introduced in the ?ir£iltti and Kentucky legislatures. Jef-
ferson and Madison were the authors of these resolutions and among
the theories propounded was one which denied, not only to the su-
preme court but to th« central government as a whole, the right
to withhold its concurrence in a law. Jefferson and Nadison took
the position that each state had an equal right to decide for it-
self.
The Virginia resolutions, of which Madison was the author,
declared that the Alien and Sedition Acts were "unconstitutional;
and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each
(state) for cooperating with this state, in maintaining unim-
paired the authorities, rights, and liberties reserved to the
2.
states respectively or to the people.* The Kentucky resolutions,
similiar in character, were introduced in the legislature of that
state by Mr. Breckinridge. The movement aimed at united action
against the central government and copies of the resolutions were
circulated among the other states.
t
in its answer, the legislature of the state of Rhode island
and Providence Plantations observed that the constitution "vests
'Kentucky Resolutions, Ell. Deb., IV, 540
1 Madison, w rks. IV, 507
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in the federal courts, exclusively, and in the Supreme Oourt of
the United States, ultimately, the authority of deciding on the
constitutionality of any act or law of the Congress of the United
States." The legislature, moreover, did not feel itself "uthor-
ized to consider and decide on the constitutionality " of the Alien
and Sedition laws.
The replies of other states were equally vigorous in pro-
testing against the theory and practice laid down in the Kentucky
and Virginia resolutions. The general assembly of Deleware re-
solved that to make the states the umpire was an "unjustifiable
interference with the general government and constituted authori-
ties of the United States and of dangerous tendency." Massachus-
etts unmasked the falacy of the resolutions and declared "that
the decision of all cases in law and equity arising under the Con-
stitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws
made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people
in the judicial courts of the United States." The I assachusetts
chronicle, in referring to the action of the legislature, declared
that "as it is so difficult for common capacities to conceive of
a sovereign so situated, that the Sovereign shall have no right
to decide on any invasion of his constitutional powers; it is hoped
for the convenience of those tender consciences who may hereafter
be called upon to swear allegiance to the State, that some gentle-
man skilled in federal logic will show how the oath of allegiance
is to be understood, that every man may be so guarded and informed,
to $
as not call upon the Deity to witness a falsehood." For this and
another article, the editor and his brother were endicted and sen-
'eII. Deb., on. cit., IV, 532
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tenced to thirty days' imprisonment . The home of Dr. Aaron Hill,
the Republican leader in the House, was stoned by a mob of Har-
vard College students, because of the attitude he had taken on
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. The Pennsylvania House en-
tered upon its journal its belief that the people of the United
States "have committed to the supreme judiciary of the nation the
high authority of ultimately and conclusively deciding upon the
constitutionality of all legislative acts."' The attitude of the
Republicans in this state is shown by an item in a Philadelphia
paper asking, "Are not the states as well as the federal govern-
ment to judge of the Constitution? is not the Constitution a con-
tract between the different states? Are not they to judge wheth-
er this contract be broken or violated? hew Hampshire and Ver-
mont iecidei that the duty of determining "the constitutionality
of the laws of the general government" is "properly and exclus-
ively confided to the judiciary department . " The Republicans in
the New York House of Representatives adopted a resolution to the
effect that "the riiYht to decide upon the constitutionality of laws
passed by Congress belongs to the judiciary, the assumption of that
power by a state legislature is unwarrantable and dangerous; this
House, accordingly, disclaims for itself such a power as that
assumed by the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky, to pass upon
either the expediency or the constitutionality of the Alien and 3e-
dition Laws." An article in the "Genius of Liberty" showed the
Republicans of New Jersey also hostile to the resolutions; if "the
'Amor. Hist. Rev.. V, 51; Ibid., 231
*Ibid . , V, 51
'ill. Deb. , IV, 53P
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states, individually, have no right to judge when the Constitu-
tion in violated by Congress, there is an end to all state sov-
ereignty, and state legislation, and we are at once consolidated.
Nearly all of the replies, w in terms more or less direct, point
to the federal juliciary as the proper authority to decide upon
the constitutionality of federal laws.^jThe conviction, it seems,
was widespread, in 1800, that the national judiciary had the right
to declare unconstitutional, both state and congressional legis-
lation.
'•Ainer. Hist. Rev., V, 55
^Ibid. , 237
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CONCLUSION
In a -^aper read before the American Historical Association,
Professor Austin Scott has divided into three periods the devel-
opment down to the present time of the right to pronounce laws
unconstitutional. The first, he says, prior to the war of inde-
pendence, was one of germination; the second, one of growing and
full consciousness, leading up to and resulting from Marshall's
decision in Marbury vs. Vadison; the third, the present, evincing
two tendencies; the finality of national legislation so far as
constitutionality is concerned, the English theory of parliament;
the other towards more distinct assertion of this power in re-
stricting state legislation. In the present investigation, the
weight of opinion even among pronounced states' rights advocates
appears to he on the side of giving the right to the federal ju-
diciary.
—0O0
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